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Confidence Predictions Affect 
Performance Confidence and 
Neural Preparation in Perceptual 
Decision Making
Annika Boldt1,2,3, Anne-Marike Schiffer1, Florian Waszak4,5 & Nick Yeung1
Decisions are usually accompanied by a feeling of being wrong or right – a subjective confidence 
estimate. But what information is this confidence estimate based on, and what is confidence used 
for? To answer these questions, research has largely focused on confidence regarding current or past 
decisions, for example identifying how characteristics of the stimulus affect confidence, how confidence 
can be used as an internally generated feedback signal, and how communicating confidence can affect 
group decisions. Here, we report two studies which implemented a novel metacognitive measure: 
predictions of confidence for future perceptual decisions. Using computational modeling of behaviour 
and EEG, we established that experience-based confidence predictions are one source of information 
that affects how confident we are in future decision-making, and that learned confidence-expectations 
affect neural preparation for future decisions. Results from both studies show that participants develop 
precise confidence predictions informed by past confidence experience. Notably, our results also 
show that confidence predictions affect performance confidence rated after a decision is made; this 
finding supports the proposal that confidence judgments are based on multiple sources of information, 
including expectations. We found strong support for this link in neural correlates of stimulus preparation 
and processing. EEG measures of preparatory neural activity (contingent negative variation; CNV) and 
evidence accumulation (centro-parietal positivity; CPP) show that predicted confidence affects neural 
preparation for stimulus processing, supporting the proposal that one purpose of confidence judgments 
may be to learn about performance for future encounters and prepare accordingly.
The decisions we make are usually accompanied by a feeling of whether the decision was wrong or right. This 
pertains to a wide range of decisions, such as selection of an action, placement of a bet, or perceptual decisions 
such as whether we can cross the road safely or will be hit by a car. This performance estimate, called a confidence 
judgment, is taken to reflect the probability of being correct1. There is ongoing debate about how – and based on 
what information – confidence judgments are formed (e.g.2). Further, the purpose of this internal judgment is 
likewise a matter of debate3,4. The present study tests the idea that experience-based confidence predictions affect 
how confident we are in future decision-making and that one purpose of confidence is to learn about perfor-
mance to prepare for future encounters of a task.
Performance confidence is influenced by physical properties of the stimulus that a decision is based on. For 
example, the quality of evidence favoring a decision (which impacts accuracy and reaction times) has been shown 
to affect confidence, thus establishing an internally generated feedback-signal5–9. However, many everyday exam-
ples suggest that confidence judgments result from the integration of multiple cues, beyond physical characteris-
tics of a stimulus: A classic example of a perceptual decision is that of a trained oncologist’s ability to discriminate 
between cancerous and healthy tissue on X-rays. Multiple cues such as familiarity with the decision and past 
experience of failure and success will likely contribute to her confidence. In other words, experience of high or 
low confidence in the past may lead to specific predictions of confidence in the present decision. Therefore, we 
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hypothesize that humans not only experience confidence in current decisions, but also learn about such confi-
dence, leading to confidence predictions for future decisions of the same type. We propose that repeated experi-
ence (performance confidence) leads to the formation of discrete expectations (predicted confidence). Conversely, 
we propose that predicted confidence is one of the cues affecting performance confidence.
The concept of predicted confidence has mostly been explored outside the field of perception in research 
on voluntary choices and investments into cognitive tasks (10,11 for review), and also in memory research, here, 
addressing whether confidence in being able to recall an item later (judgements of learning; JOLs) affects how 
much time we allocate to studying this item12. A recent study by Fleming and colleagues13 yielded several inter-
esting findings, demonstrating that participants are capable of forming accurate global prospective confidence 
judgements regarding an upcoming perceptual decision, and that such predictions are largely based on their 
accuracy over several previous trials. However, in their paradigm, accuracy across the entire experiment was 
fixed using a staircase procedure. The question therefore remains whether people are capable of tracking highly 
specific confidence predictions. More fundamentally, it remains unclear whether predicted confidence affects 
performance and associated confidence during perceptual decision-making processes, or whether these aspects of 
perceptual decisions rely purely on the quality of the evidence on which the decision is based (and is not informed 
by expectations).
The current study investigates two main questions. First, we tested whether human observers acquire 
stimulus-type specific confidence predictions based on experienced confidence in perceptual decision mak-
ing. Further, we hypothesized that confidence predictions would be flexibly updated when changes in 
task-contingencies led to mismatches between predicted and performance confidence. We used EEG to measure 
whether neural signatures of stimulus preparation and stimulus processing would show a modulation by (pre-
dicted) confidence, which would furthermore suggest that predicted confidence is used to guide how people 
approach upcoming decisions. Second, we hypothesized a bi-directional link between prediction and experience, 
meaning that confidence predictions would not only be influenced by, but also modulate performance confi-
dence. Establishing an influence of confidence predictions on performance confidence would support the notion 
that confidence estimates integrate multiple cues, extending beyond the two best established factors: the stimulus’ 
physical properties and - partly as a result of the latter - the reaction time of the perceptual decision (cf7.).
Crucially, these ideas do not imply that predicted and performance confidence represent readouts of two 
entirely separable signals. Instead, this multiple cue account is closely related to a Bayesian framework of human 
cognition14,15, which proposes that continuous and flexible updating of beliefs based on both existing beliefs 
(priors) and newly incoming information is key to efficient successful behavior16–18. In this model, predicted 
confidence acts as a prior for performance confidence and the continuous update of prior confidence allows 
participants to form accurate beliefs about their own performance. What people report after the decision, termed 
performance confidence in the present study, translates into a posterior that integrates the prior with components 
of the decision itself. To summarize, we hypothesize that experience-based confidence predictions have an effect 
on stimulus processing and performance confidence. Moreover, mismatches between prediction and experienced 
confidence are expected to promote an update, so that future predictions are more precise. To measure these 
updates irrespective of task-performance, we implemented a task in which there are no known strategy changes 
that affect performance.
Our task consisted of a two-alternative forced-choice color judgment. Visual cues preceded the target stimulus 
and were matched to specific stimulus configurations known to elicit four different levels of performance con-
fidence7,19. These four different confidence levels have been shown to dissociate partly from accuracy, allowing 
us to test whether subjective performance confidence, rather than objective accuracy, drives learning of confi-
dence predictions. We expected the cues to become associated with the specific performance-confidence levels, as 
expressed in self-reported predicted confidence towards the cue. We further employed EEG to measure whether 
confidence predictions affect neural processing: confidence predictions were hypothesized to scale with the CNV 
component, a negative going slow-wave potential preceding the onset of the task-relevant stimulus, which is asso-
ciated with the readiness to process a stimulus20. We expected that higher confidence predictions would lead to 
a larger CNV component, signifying the readiness to respond quickly under conditions of increased confidence.
We further expected that a neural marker of perceptual decision making - the centro-parietal positivity (CPP) 
component - would show differences in amplitude between the four different stimulus categories. The CPP is 
associated with accumulation of evidence in favor of one of two options in a decision, and peaks at the time at 
which the decision is made21,22. CPP built-up rate (slope) and amplitude have been shown to be related to reaction 
times21,22 and to be affected by internal influences on stimulus processing, such as attention22. Our experiment 
allowed us to test whether the behavioral differences between conditions, particularly differences in confidence, 
would be associated with differences in CPP amplitude.
Results
Experiment 1. The core task in both experiments consisted of an established paradigm in which participants 
had to indicate whether an array of 8 red, purple, and blue shapes was on average more red or more blue7,19,23–25 
(Fig. 1). Subsequently, they had to indicate how certain they were that their response was correct or incorrect7,19. 
A schematic representation of the task structure together with the four difficulty conditions is given in Fig. 1, 
Panel A, referred to as the Standard Trial.
Stimuli varied along two dimensions: First, they differed in terms of the mean evidence in the distribution of 
colored shapes that formed the array. Decreasing the mean (i.e., using colors that were, on average, purple hues 
rather than clear red or blue) made the task more difficult. Second, they differed in terms of the variance in the 
distribution of colors. Increasing the variance (i.e., using colors that were a heterogeneous mix of reds, blues and 
purples rather than a homogeneous hue) made the task more difficult. Four conditions were created by factorial 
crossing of these two stimulus dimensions: An Easy condition had a high mean (on average the color was clearly 
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red or clearly blue) and low stimulus variance (all shapes exhibited this difference). Conversely, the Difficult con-
dition had a low stimulus mean (the average color was “purplish red” or “purplish blue”) and variance was high 
(some shapes were red and others blue). Crucially, the two remaining conditions were both of Medium difficulty, 
but with this difficulty reflecting different stimulus characteristics. The first medium condition was the low mean, 
low variance condition - the average color was “purplish red” or “purplish blue”, but the shapes were relatively 
homogeneous in color. The second Medium condition was the high mean, high variance condition - the average 
color was distant from the category boundary but the shapes differed widely from one another in hue (e.g., includ-
ing clearly red and clearly blue patches in the same array). Performance was matched between these two medium 
conditions using the staircase procedure described in the Methods. Because performance (matched) and confi-
dence (which differed, see below) dissociate in medium conditions, these provide an ideal test for the hypothesis 
that predicted confidence would follow confidence judgments, rather than objective accuracy.
The novel feature of the task compared to previous work7,19,23–25 was the introduction of predictive cues that 
preceded the color array (target stimulus) by 1200 ms. We used 5 different cues, consisting of familiar shapes 
(square, triangle, circle, pentagon, diamond). Four of the cues were matched to a specific condition (see below), 
with each cue always preceding the same condition (randomized across participants). The fifth cue preceded each 
of the four conditions equally often (neutral cue, hereafter). Participants were told that the cues might relate to 
how they feel about a trial, but not told explicitly about the systematic relationship to the conditions, nor that each 
stimulus could be categorized as falling into one of four conditions.
Following each perceptual decision, participants had to indicate their confidence in this decision (performance 
confidence) on a six-point scale (“certainly wrong”, “probably wrong”, “maybe wrong”, “maybe correct”, “probably 
correct”, “certainly correct”).
Performance Measures. Effects of condition were tested in repeated-measures ANOVAs, and planned 
paired-sample t-tests between conditions (two-tailed α-level = 0.05). Participants showed graded accuracy of 
responses between conditions (Fig. 2, Panel A). As expected, participants reached the highest percentage of cor-
rect responses in the easy condition (90.7%), and performed worst in the difficult condition (70.1%). Further, 
the medium conditions were well matched, with accuracy in the low mean, low variance condition at 79.7% 
and in the high mean, high variance condition at 79.9%. In a univariate ANOVA with CONDITION (4-levels) 
as independent variable, this factor had a significant effect (F(3,45) = 74.9, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.83, 95% CI [0.81, 
0.88]). Four paired-samples t-tests between the easy condition and each medium condition respectively as well 
as between the difficult condition and each medium condition showed significant differences (all p < 0.001, all 
t(15) > 7.1, all r equivalent > 0.79, see Supplemental Table 1 for details). In contrast, the paired-samples t-test 
Figure 1. (A) The perceptual decision task consisted of two trial types. During Standard Trials, participants first 
viewed a visual (shape) cue. They then had to indicate whether an array of eight colored shapes was on average 
more red or more blue by pressing the left or right response key. The colored shapes were spaced regularly 
around a fixation point (radius 2.8″ visual arc). After making their response, the confidence scale was presented 
on screen and participants were given unlimited time to choose how confident they were that their last response 
was correct. During Prediction Trials, participants were also presented with the cue but instead of viewing the 
color stimulus, they were asked to rate how confident they were that they would have given a correct response, 
had they been presented with a stimulus. CSI: cue-stimulus interval; RSI: stimulus- response interval. (B) 
Sample stimuli, showing the four difficulty conditions in the 2 (mean) × 2 (variance) × 2 (color) design. The 
color stimuli were preceded by visual shapes that acted as predictive cues. The cue-condition contingency was 
reversed after Block 4 in Experiment 2. Color values are made more extreme for illustrative purposes.
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Figure 2. Accuracy (top), performance confidence (middle) and predicted confidence (bottom) in Experiment 
1 (left) and Experiment 2 (right). Performance differs between easy and medium, easy and difficult, and 
medium and difficult trials, but not reliably between the two medium conditions (low low, high high). 
Confidence (both related to performance on the last trial and predictions concerning the next stimulus) differs 
between medium conditions, with the low low condition leading to higher confidence estimates than the 
high high condition. Single dots show single-subject data, bars display mean of the distribution (solid line), 
95% confidence interval (dark grey shaded area), and 1 standard deviation (light grey shaded area). The data 
presented for Experiment 1 comprises all six experimental blocks, whereas the data presented for Experiment 
2 comprises only the first four of six experimental blocks (those prior to the switch in the cue-condition 
contingencies).
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between mean accuracy scores in the medium conditions showed no significant difference (t < 1); we thus find 
that objective accuracy was well-matched between the two medium conditions. The Bayes Factor in favor of this 
Null hypothesis of equality was BF01 = 3.87.
Reaction times (RTs) of correct responses showed the same overall pattern, with the fastest RTs in the easy 
condition (726 ms) and the slowest mean RTs in the most difficult condition (824 ms), again replicating previous 
findings. RTs averaged 770 ms in the low mean, low variance condition and 809 ms in the high mean, high vari-
ance condition. Entering RTs into a univariate ANOVA with CONDITION (4-levels) as independent variable, we 
found this factor to have a significant effect on RTs (F(3,45) = 15.9 p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.51, 95% CI [0.39, 0.66]). In 
contrast to our previous findings7, however, RTs in medium conditions differed significantly in a paired-samples 
t-test (t(15) = 2.4, p = 0.03, r equivalent = 0.41, 95% CI [0.14, 0.64]) with slower responses in the high mean, high 
variance condition than the low mean, low variance condition.
Participants were most efficient in the easy condition (779.61 IES; inverse efficiency score26 calculated as 
median correct RT divided by accuracy), and least efficient in the difficult condition (1160.25 IES). Efficiency in 
medium conditions fell between efficiency scores in the easy and difficult conditions (low mean, low variance: 
946.46 IES, high mean, high variance: 993.84 IES). The univariate ANOVA again showed that CONDITION had 
a significant effect on performance (F(3,45) = 41.1, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.73, 95% CI [0.69, 0.82]). Efficiency between 
medium conditions did not differ significantly (t(15) = 1.3, p = 0.21, r equivalent = 0.23, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.53]). 
The Bayes Factor in favour of this Null hypothesis of equality was BF01 = 1.87.
Performance Confidence. The first of the two main analyses aimed to establish the hypothesized graded effect 
of conditions on performance confidence, with a significant difference between medium conditions. The results 
support this hypothesis, with a main effect of CONDITION in a univariate ANOVA (F(3,45) = 20.3, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.58, 95% CI [0.45, 0.72]), and a significant difference of average performance confidence between the two 
medium conditions in a planned pairwise contrast (t(15) = 2.4, p = 0.03, r equivalent = 0.40, 95% CI [0.13, 0.64], 
Fig. 2). As predicted, performance confidence was lower in the high mean, high variance condition than the low 
mean, low variance condition7,19 (Fig. 2, Panel B). Confidence further differed predictably between the easy con-
dition and both medium conditions as well as between the difficult condition and both medium conditions (all 
ts > 3.2, all ps < 0.006, all r equivalent > 0.50, Supplementary Table 1 for details). See Supplementary Information 
an analysis of error awareness.
Predicted Confidence. In addition to the standard trials, we introduced confidence prediction trials, which made 
use of the predictive cues in our novel version of the task. These confidence prediction trials started exactly as 
the standard trials with the presentation of a predictive cue. However, following the 1200 ms delay, participants 
were presented with a confidence-judgment scale instead of the stimulus array. Their task was to estimate: “how 
well [they] think [they] would do on a trial that is preceded by the symbol [they] have just seen”. The scale was 
identical to the 6-point scale for performance confidence judgments in standard trials. Following this confidence 
rating (predicted confidence), an entirely new trial began following the ITI (of 1 second).
We found that predicted confidence fully matched with performance confidence. There was a strong influence 
of CONDITION on predicted confidence (F(3,45) = 10.5, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.41, 95% CI [0.23, 0.60]) in the uni-
variate ANOVA (Fig. 2, Panel C). Of particular interest, we observed a significant difference between predicted 
confidence in the medium conditions (t(15) = 2.9, p = 0.01, r equivalent = 0.46, 95% CI [0.21, 0.68]), with confi-
dence again being lower in the high mean, high variance condition than the low mean, low variance condition. 
As expected, confidence further differed significantly between the easy condition and both medium conditions as 
well as between the difficult condition and both medium conditions (ps < 0.049, ts > 2.1, all r equivalent > 0.37, 
Supplementary Table 1 for details).
Thus, participants learnt to accurately predict their confidence across conditions, even for distinctions as 
subtle as the performance confidence difference across two conditions that were objectively well-matched in 
objective accuracy and overall performance efficiency. As such, these results provide strong evidence that human 
observers develop stimulus-category specific confidence predictions in decision making. Experiment 2 built on 
this conclusion to investigate the neural correlates of these confidence predictions, and their impact on perfor-
mance confidence.
Experiment 2. Behavior. Experiment 2 contained the same types of trials - standard trials and prediction 
trials - as Experiment 1. All variables of stimulus presentation and response mode were also kept constant, and 
the staircase procedure was identical. The experiments differed only with regard to the EEG recordings and one 
crucial element of the design: In Experiment 1, the cue-condition contingencies were stable for all 6 experimental 
blocks whereas in Experiment 2, the cue-condition contingencies reversed after the fourth of 6 blocks. Specifically, 
the cue that preceded trials of the easy condition in Blocks 1–4 preceded trials of the difficult condition in Blocks 5 
and 6, and vice versa. A corresponding switch in cue-condition contingencies after 4 blocks was applied to the two 
medium conditions. The neutral cue remained neutral (non-predictive) throughout all 6 blocks.
This variation of the setup allowed us to test for two important predictions concerning the influence of con-
fidence predictions on behavior: First, switching of the cues provided us with a sensitive measure of the influ-
ence of confidence predictions on performance confidence. We expected to find altered performance confidence 
judgments in the block immediately following the switch (Block 5). Specifically we expected that performance 
confidence would integrate predicted confidence (based on previous cue-confidence contingencies) and therefore 
be biased towards the mean. In detail, we predicted that cues previously associated with low confidence would 
decrease performance confidence after easy and low mean, low variance trials; therefore, confidence in these 
trials should be lower in the post-switch block (Block 5) than in the pre-switch block (Block 4). Conversely, we 
expected performance confidence on difficult and high mean, high variance trials to be higher in the post-switch 
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block (Block 5) than in the pre-switch block (Block 4). The rationale for this prediction was that participants’ 
expectation to perform well in the task (driven by a cue so far associated with highly confident trials) would con-
tribute to their performance confidence judgment and bias it towards higher confidence. The second aspect of this 
design is that it allows us to test the degree to which feedback-free learning of confidence associations is dynamic 
and rapidly modified by experience. We hypothesized that predicted confidence would show gradual adaption to 
the new cue-condition contingencies: We hence expected confidence predictions to be realigned with confidence 
judgments towards the end of the experiment (Block 6), but not immediately after the switch of cue-condition 
contingencies (Block 5).
Performance Measures: As in Experiment 1, performance measures were accuracy, RT, and efficiency. We applied 
the same measures as in Experiment 1: univariate ANOVAs of CONDITION, and planned t-tests (with α = 0.05). 
Further, because Experiment 2 included the crucial design element of a switch of cue-condition contingencies, we 
also introduced SWITCH (pre/switch) as a factor in the analysis. In these analyses, we directly compare two blocks 
prior to, during, or after the switch. For all analyses, we explicitly state which blocks were analyzed.
Analysis of RTs and accuracy in the four blocks before the switch of cue-contingencies replicated the main 
effects established in Experiment 1. The 4-level univariate ANOVAs showed significant effects of CONDITION 
both for accuracy (F(3,51) = 87.4, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.84, 95% CI [0.79, 0.90]; Fig. 2) and for correct RTs 
(F(3,51) = 40.8, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.71, 95% CI [0.62, 0.81]). We established again that accuracy in the easy and 
difficult conditions differed significantly from both medium conditions, in four respective paired t-tests (all 
ps < 0.001, all ts > 6.9, all r equivalent > 0.76, Supplemental Table 1 for details). As previously shown, there was 
no significant difference between medium conditions in percent correct responses (t < 1). The Bayes Factor in 
favor of this Null hypothesis of equality was BF01 = 3.58. Participants were again slower in the high mean, high 
variance condition than in the low mean, low variance condition (t(17) = 4.0, p = 0.001, r equivalent = 0.56, 95% 
CI [0.36, 0.75]).
These RT differences have predictable effects on efficiency in the four blocks prior to the switch of cue-contingencies: 
We replicated the main effect of CONDITION in the univariate 4-level ANOVA (F(3,51) = 85.3, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.83, 
95% CI [0.78, 0.90]), with highest efficiency in easy trials (744.75 IES) and lowest efficiency in difficult trials (1212.46 
IES); we also find a significant difference between medium conditions (higher efficiency in the low mean, low variance 
condition; 905.73 IES vs. 973.45 IES; t(17) = 2.4, p = 0.03, r equivalent = 0.38, 95% CI [0.15, 0.55]), as a result of faster, 
yet equally accurate responses in the low mean, low variance condition. To dissociate effects of (cue-driven) predicted 
confidence and stimulus characteristics on perceptual decision-making and performance confidence, we entered the 
average accuracy measured as percentage correct responses in Blocks 4 and 5 into a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
the factors CONDITION (4 levels) and SWITCH (2 levels: pre/switch; that is Block 4 vs. 5). We found no indica-
tion that participants performed better or worse in any condition after the switch of cue-condition contingencies. The 
repeated-measures ANOVA yielded the expected main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 39.5, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.70, 
95% CI [0.63, 0.80]), but no main effect of SWITCH (F < 1), and no reliable interaction (F(3,51) = 1.1, p = 0.35, 
ηp2 = 0.06, 95% CI [0.03, 0.25]). The corresponding repeated measures ANOVA on RTs yielded the same result, with 
the expected main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 15.6, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.48, 95% CI [0.27, 0.70]), but no main effect 
of SWITCH (F < 1), and no reliable interaction (F(3,51) = 1.8, p = 0.16, ηp2 = 0.09, 95% CI [0.03, 0.28]).
Performance Confidence: Analysis of both performance confidence and predicted confidence was performed 
separately for blocks before and after the switch. Confidence measures prior to the switch, in blocks with the 
original cue-condition contingencies, constitute a replication of Experiment 1. The two blocks after the switch 
allow us to test two different aspects of our hypotheses: First, we hypothesized that changing the cue-condition 
contingencies will affect performance confidence, as previous associations led to confidence prediction errors. A 
direct comparison of confidence judgments in the last block before (Block 4) and the first block after the switch 
(Block 5), allows us to assess the influence of (old) confidence predictions on performance confidence.
In the first 4 blocks of the experiment, we replicated the differences in decision-confidence between conditions 
that were also included in Experiment 1: There was a significant effect of CONDITION in the 4-level univari-
ate ANOVA (F(3,51) = 42.6, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.71, 95% CI [0.64, 0.81]), and the paired-samples t-test between 
medium conditions likewise yielded a significant result (t(17) = 2.4, p = 0.03, r equivalent = 0.38, 95% CI [0.08, 
0.64]), with lower performance confidence in the high mean, high variance condition than in the low mean, low 
variance condition (Fig. 2). See Supplementary Information an analysis of error awareness.
Predicted Confidence: Testing for the effect of CONDITION on predicted confidence, we found the predicted sig-
nificant main effect in the 4-level univariate ANOVA (F(3,51) = 12.8, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.43, 95% CI [0.30, 0.60]), 
showing that participants learned to predict how confident they typically felt following judgments on specific 
stimulus categories. The difference between medium conditions did not reach significance at the chosen alpha 
level of 5% (t(17) = 1.3, p = 0.20, r equivalent = 0.22, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.57]). The Bayes Factor in favor of this 
Null hypothesis of equality was BF01 = 1.90. To ensure that the non-significant effect on the difference between 
medium conditions (which was in the same direction as the significant effect in Experiment 1) did not point to 
substantial differences between the experiments, we pooled the data from both studies and conducted a 2 × 2 
mixed-measures ANOVA with the between-subject factor EXPERIMENT (1/2) and the within-subject factor 
(MEDIUM CONDITION). This test showed that there was a significant effect of MEDIUM CONDITION on 
confidence across the entire pooled population (F(1,32) = 7.0, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 0.18, 95% CI [0.04, 0.41]), but no 
significant effect of EXPERIMENT (F(1,32) = 2.6, p = 0.12, ηp2 = 0.07, 95% CI [0.002, 0.26]) and, crucially, no 
reliable interaction (F < 1). Collectively, these results replicate the novel findings from Experiment 1 that people 
acquire category-specific confidence predictions.
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Predicted Confidence Modulates Performance Confidence After the Cue-contingency Switch. The results in 
Experiment 1, and in the initial blocks of Experiment 2, indicate that participants formed confidence predictions 
for the different condition cues. However, the impact of such cues on behavior in these blocks are impossible to 
disentangle from the behavioral effects of the conditions themselves, given the consistent association between 
cues and conditions. In contrast, in the post-switch adaptation blocks (Blocks 5 and 6), predictions and experi-
ence are set in conflict (at least until the new contingencies are learned). Thus, contrasting pre- and post-switch 
behavior (Fig. 3) enabled us to study the interaction between predicted confidence and performance confidence.
As shown in the lower panels of Fig. 3, adaptation of predicted confidence was a gradual learning process after 
the switch in cue-condition contingencies. Prior to the switch, predicted confidence closely tracked performance 
confidence and, but for the small but robust difference in confidence between medium conditions, also tracked 
objective accuracy. However, after the switch, predicted confidence varied much less systematically across condi-
tions (Fig. 3, lower middle panel). These differences were apparent in a 4 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
factors CONDITION (1–4) and SWITCH (pre/switch; that is Block 4 vs. 5), which yielded a significant effect of 
CONDITION (F(3,51) = 4.1, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 0.20, 95% CI [0.07, 0.38]), no significant effect of SWITCH (F < 1), 
but a significant interaction (F(3,51) = 3.6, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.18, 95% CI [0.08, 0.37]).
Thus, in the immediate post-switch block (Block 5), confidence predictions differed from experienced con-
fidence across conditions. To investigate the effects of this interaction between prediction and experience, we 
analyzed participants’ performance confidence ratings in the blocks immediately before and after the switch (left 
Figure 3. Accuracy (top), performance confidence (middle) and predicted confidence (bottom) in the last 
block prior to the switch (left), the switch block (middle column), and the block after the switch (right). Single 
dots show single-subject data, bars display mean of the distribution (solid line), 95% confidence interval (dark 
grey shaded area), and 1 standard deviation (light grey shaded area). Performance remains largely unaffected 
by the switch in cue-condition contingencies. Performance confidence for difficult trials is increased after the 
switch. Predicted confidence measures show adaptation to the new contingencies, with accurate predictions in 
the second block following the switch.
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and middle panel), using a 4 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors CONDITION (1–4) and SWITCH 
(pre/switch; that is Block 4 vs. 5). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 22.0, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.56, 95% CI [0.47, 0.68]), no significant effect of SWITCH (F < 1), but a significant interaction 
(F(3,51) = 6.7, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.28, 95% CI [0.16, 0.48]).
As shown in Fig. 3 and Table 1, the variability of performance confidence across conditions was reduced 
following the switch of cue-contingencies, largely due to the fact that participants became more confident on 
difficult trials. Thus, pairwise contrasts between pre- and switch performance confidence for each condition sep-
arately revealed only a significant increase in confidence in difficult trials (which were preceded by cues by that 
previously preceded easy trials; t(17) = 3.5, p = 0.003, r equivalent = 0.51, 95% CI [0.21, 0.80]). No other differ-
ences were reliable (Table 1). This constitutes partial confirmation of our predictions, with learnt cue associations 
leading to increased confidence on difficult trials, but little evidence of a corresponding decrease in confidence on 
easy trials. We thus find that predicted confidence becomes integrated into performance confidence, although the 
effect does not reach significance in all conditions.
A final analysis concerned the hypothesized re-adjustment of confidence predictions, resulting from the mis-
match between predicted and performance confidence in the switch block (Block 5). A visual description of these 
changes is shown in Fig. 3, in the rightmost panel. To this end we compare performance confidence between the 
last block before the switch (Block 4) and the last block following the switch (Block 6). The according repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 22.1, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.57, 95% CI [0.48, 
0.69]), no main effect of SWITCH (F < 1), and contrary to the comparison with the switch block, the interaction 
between CONDITION and SWITCH did not reach significance at the chosen alpha level of 5% (F(3,51) = 2.3, 
p = 0.08, ηp2 = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.28]). As evident in Fig. 3, numerically there was a decrease in confidence 
on difficult trials, reverting back towards the pre-switch levels. There were no significant differences between 
performance confidence judgments within a condition in the comparison of the pre-switch (Block 4) and the 
last post-switch block (Block 6; Table 1). As expected, we find an adjustment in predictions, too, showing that 
participants successfully re-learned predictions associated with each stimulus as a result of the experienced con-
fidence. This re-learning of predictions is borne out by the repeated measures ANOVA, showing an effect of 
CONDITION (F(3,51) = 5.6, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.25, 95% CI [0.13, 0.42]), but no main effect of SWITCH (F < 1), 
and no significant interaction (F < 1). Likewise, none of the within-condition, across-block comparisons reached 
significance (Table 1).
To conclude, we found a bi-directional link between predictive and performance confidence: Predictive confi-
dence modulated performance confidence (evident in the switch block; Block 5), but was also adapted as a result 
of mismatches between predicted and experienced confidence (evident in the final block; Block 6).
Summary of Behavioral Results. The central finding of Experiment 1 - that participants can acquire cue-based 
confidence predictions - was replicated here. Confidence predictions closely tracked reported performance con-
fidence, even when performance confidence dissociated from objective accuracy. Experiment 2 further showed 
that learned confidence predictions can modulate performance confidence, despite a lack of reliable change in 
objective performance. Finally, confidence predictions were gradually updated following confidence prediction 
errors in feedback-free environments, and concurred with performance confidence in the second block after the 
switch in cue contingencies (Block 6).
EEG. The critical measures for the EEG analysis were the amplitudes of the CNV, a pre-stimulus slow-wave 
component that reflects preparation for stimulus processing, and the CPP, a post-stimulus centro-parietal com-
ponent that reflects external and internal effects on decision making in its slope and amplitude. Analysis of the 
EEG data follows the behavioral analysis, focusing on the effect of CONDITION in a univariate ANOVA and 
Pre-switch to Switch Pre-switch to Post-switch
Performance 
Confidence t p r.e. CI
Performance 
Confidence t p r.e. CI
Easy −1.0 0.31 −0.18 −0.49, 0.15 Easy −1.3 0.22 −0.21 −0.41, 0.11
Low, low 1.7 0.11 0.27 −0.01, 0.52 Low, low 0.50 0.62 0.09 −0.26, 0.44
High, high −1.0 0.33 −0.17 −0.52, 0.16 High, high 1.6 0.14 0.26 −0.05, 0.56
Difficult 3.5 0.003 0.51 0.21, 0.80 Difficult 1.6 0.12 0.27 −0.03, 0.53
Predicted Confidence Predicted Confidence
Easy −1.0 0.31 −0.18 −0.50, 0.15 Easy −1.2 0.26 −0.20 −0.56, 0.14
Low, low 1.0 0.36 0.16 −0.17, 0.47 Low, low 0.56 0.58 0.10 −0.36, 0.34
High, high −0.8 0.44 −0.14 −0.42, 0.21 High, high −0.3 0.78 −0.05 −0.0, 0.28
Difficult 2.0 0.07 0.32 −0.01, 0.65 Difficult 0.04 0.97 0.01 −0.35, 0.34
Table 1. Confidence ratings, compared by condition both between the last block prior to the switch and the 
switch block (left column) and the last block prior to the switch and the second block after the switch. Switch-
effects (significant interaction) are carried by confidence changes in difficult trials. Positive t-values indicate 
average confidence values that are larger in the switch block than pre-switch block, or larger in the post-switch 
block than pre-switch block. All df = 17.
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differences between medium conditions in paired t-tests to assess the effects of confidence on neural signatures 
of stimulus preparation and processing.
CNV: The first question addressed with the EEG analysis was whether confidence predictions would modu-
late preparation for stimulus processing. The CNV is a useful marker of such covert internal preparation. CNV 
amplitude was quantified in 4 adjacent time-windows, each 100 ms, covering the 400 ms prior to stimulus onset. 
ERPs were measured across an electrode cluster consisting of C3 – CZ – C4 – CP3 – CPZ – CP4 – P3 – PZ – P4 
in the first 4 blocks of the experiment (in the acquisition phase, before cue-condition contingencies switched). We 
expected CNV amplitude to scale with predicted confidence, as larger amplitudes are associated with a greater 
readiness to process and respond to a stimulus20,27. We therefore predicted the highest amplitude following cues 
associated with easy trials and lowest amplitude following cues associated with difficult trials. We also tested for 
a difference in amplitude between cues indicating the medium conditions, in line with the differences between 
predicted confidence.
The first-pass analysis therefore included one 4-level factor for the 4 cue CONDITIONs, one 4-level factor 
for the 4 TIMEWINDOWs, and one 3-level factor for the 3 degrees of POSTERIORITY (1: C3 – CZ – C4, 2: 
CP3 – CPZ – CP4, 3: P3 – PZ – P4) to assess the scalp topography of observed effects. This repeated-measures 
ANOVA yielded the expected main effect of TIMEWINDOW (F(3,51) = 8.8, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.34, 95% CI 
[0.11, 0.48]) with an increase in amplitude over time, a significant main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 3.0, 
p = 0.04, ηp2 = 0.15, 95% CI [0.00, 0.29]), with an increase in amplitude from difficult to difficult easy trials, and 
no reliable effect of POSTERIORITY (F < 1). There was a significant interaction between TIMEWINDOW and 
POSTERIORITY (F(6,102) = 6.8, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.28, 95% CI [0.11, 0.38]), as the negative amplitude was larger 
at more posterior electrodes, but no other reliable interactions (Fs < 1). The main effect of condition was driven 
by an increase in CNV amplitude following easy cues (Fig. 4). Easy cues elicited the largest (negative) amplitude; 
paired t-tests showed that the amplitude difference between easy and difficult trials was statistically significant 
(t(17) = 2.4, p = 0.03, r equivalent = 0.39, 95% CI [0.10, 0.65]). Given this association with predictive confidence, 
we might expect greater CNV amplitude following cues associated with low mean, low variance trials than fol-
lowing cues associated with high mean, high variance trials. However, although a small numerical trend in the 
expected direction was observed (−1.14 μV vs. −0.98 μV), the difference was not significant (t < 1). The Bayes 
Factor in favor of this Null hypothesis of equality was BF01 = 3.54.
CPP: The second neural marker of interest, the centro-parietal positivity (CPP), was used to assess whether the 
neural correlates of stimulus processing would be modulated by confidence and performance. Focusing on the 
electrode cluster CZ – CPZ – PZ, we measured CPP amplitude as participants’ individual peak between 180 to 
80 ms before the response (calculated separate for each electrode), and slope as a participant-wise linear fit to the 
data between 400 to 100 ms before the response (averages across electrodes; cf.21,22). To estimate effects of RT on 
the component, all trials were sorted by each participant’s median RT in each specific condition, creating two 
equal sized cells of fast versus slow trials in each condition.
The CPP slope is associated with internal and external influences on the sampling process that also affect RTs, 
while amplitude is suggested to reflect an internally regulated decision threshold21,22. We thus expected RTs to 
Figure 4. Time-voltage plots and scalp topographies showing the differences in CNV amplitude across 
conditions. Statistical analyses rely on the 4 time windows (T1-T4) prior to stimulus onset. Data are not 
smoothed for display purposes. Shaded error bars depict the standard error of the mean. Scalp topographies 
show the average amplitude across T4 (100 to 0 ms prior to response), thresholded between −3 and 1 µV.
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account for the larger part of the variance in the slope of the CPP, with a smaller effect of stimulus condition22. 
Further, we expected to see differences in CPP amplitude across conditions above and beyond differences driven 
by RT, in line with the result of the drift-diffusion model of the data, which suggests that decision thresholds vary 
between conditions (see Supplementary Information). Finally, we tested whether these differences between con-
ditions would be affected by expectations, exploiting the dissociation between expectations and actual conditions 
provided by the switch in cue-condition contingencies.
Slope showed a significant effect of CONDITION (Fig. 5a) in the univariate ANOVA (F(3,51) = 6.2, p = 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.27, 95% CI [0.14, 0.48]). However, when trials were split by fast and slow RTs, we found that, as expected, 
most of that effect can be attributed to the difference in stimulus processing: A repeated-measures ANOVA 
with the factors RT (fast vs. slow) and CONDITION showed a significant effect of RT (F(1,17) = 15.8, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.48, 95% CI [0.28, 0.69]), whereas the effect of CONDITION did not reach significance at the chosen alpha 
level of 5% (F(3,51) = 2.3, p = 0.09, ηp2 = 0.12, 95% CI [0.04, 0.33]). There was furthermore no reliable interaction 
(F(3,51) = 0.49, p = 0.69, ηp2 = 0.03, 95% CI [0.01, 0.21]; Fig. 5b).
Analysis of the trials with neutral cues, which do not predict stimulus category, yielded no statistically sig-
nificant difference in slope between conditions. The univariate ANOVA testing the 4-level factor CONDITION 
revealed no reliable effect of stimulus category (F(3,51) = 2.0, p = 0.13, ηp2 = 0.11, 95% CI [0.03, 0.31]). Because 
this analysis involves fitting linear trends to a small set of data points (only 20% of trials were preceded by neutral 
cues), this null-effect is inconclusive as it may have been caused by a disproportionately small sample size (low 
trial numbers) and therefore a poor signal-to-noise ratio, compared to other analyses.
We were interested in amplitude differences driven by expectations around the switch in cue-condition con-
tingencies, and for the sake of completeness also performed the same repeated measures ANOVA on the slope 
data focusing on the last block prior to the switch (Block 4) and the switch block (Block 5). We found a significant 
effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 7.8, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.31, 95% CI [0.13, 0.54]) but only a numerical trend of 
cue-contingency SWITCH that did not reach significance at the chosen alpha level of 5% (F(1,17) = 3.2, p = 0.09, 
ηp2 = 0.16, 95% CI [0.01, 0.46]) and no reliable interaction (F < 1). Note that this analysis does not control for the 
effects of RT (Fig. 6).
Together these results replicate the finding that CPP slope is modulated by the internal and external influences 
on perceptual decision making that affect RTs. It remains unclear, however, which, if any, modulation arises from 
expectations of the specific stimulus condition.
A drift-diffusion model analysis of the present two datasets (see Supplementary Information; see also28) sug-
gests that participants adjusted their decision threshold for each condition. We tested whether this behavior 
was also reflected in the CPP amplitude, a neural marker of evidence-to-bound accumulation. In a first step, 
a repeated measures ANOVA with factors of CONDITION (4 levels) and POSTERIORITY (3 levels; 1: CZ, 2: 
CPZ, 3: PZ) revealed a main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 5.2, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.23, 95% CI [0.10, 0.46]) and 
a main effect of POSTERIORITY (F(2,34) = 4.4, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.21, 95% CI [0.04, 0.56]; Fig. 6), but no reliable 
Figure 5. (A) Time-voltage plots and scalp-topographies showing the CPP in the blocks prior to the switch in 
cue-condition contingencies. Inserts show single-subject data for CPP amplitude and slope across conditions. 
Scalp topographies show voltage averages 180 to 80 ms prior to response. All topographies are thresholded 
between 2 and 7 µV. Data are not smoothed for display purposes. Shaded error bars depict the standard error 
of the mean. (B) CPP amplitude and slope plotted on the single-subject level for fast and slow trials separately. 
Single dots show single-subject data, bars display mean of the distribution (solid line), 95% confidence interval 
(dark grey shaded area), and 1 standard deviation (light grey shaded area). Amplitude differences across 
conditions show little variation by RT, however, RT does modulate differences in slope across conditions. Time-
window for Amplitude: 180 to 80 ms prior to response. Time-window for calculation of Slope: 400 to 100 ms 
prior to response.
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interaction (F < 1). Numerically, easy trials lead to the largest CPP amplitude, followed by low mean, low variance 
trials, high mean, high variance trials, and finally difficult trials with the lowest CPP amplitude (Fig. 5a).
Pairwise comparisons between neighboring conditions showed that the only significant difference in CPP 
amplitude was between easy and low mean, low variance trials (t(17) = 2.4, p = 0.03, r equivalent = 0.38, 95% 
CI [0.08, 0.63]). In particular, there was no difference between medium conditions (t(17) = 1.3, p = 0.22, 
r equivalent = 0.22, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.62]). The Bayes Factor in favor of this Null hypothesis of equality was 
BF01 = 2.03. This pattern corresponds to modeled decision boundaries, which were also amplified for easy trials 
(see Supplementary Information).
In contrast to the findings for CPP slope, the amplitude differences were not sufficiently explained by differ-
ences in RT. Trials sorted into slow and fast trials by median split were entered into a 4 × 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA, yielding a significant main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 6.9, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.29, 95% CI [0.14, 
0.53], and a main effect of RT (F(1,17) = 6.7, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.28, 95% CI [0.07, 0.57]), with no interaction (F < 1; 
Fig. 5b).
Switching cue-condition contingencies in the later stages of our experiment provided us with a test for the 
effect of predicted confidence on neural correlates of stimulus processing. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
the factors CONDITION (4 levels) and POSTERIORITY (3 levels; 1: CZ, 2: CPZ, 3: PZ) and SWITCH (pre/
switch; that is Blocks 4 and 5) revealed a main effect of CONDITION (F(3,51) = 3.8, p = 0.01, ηp2 = 0.18, 95% CI 
[0.01, 0.33]) and a main effect of POSTERIORITY (F(2,34) = 4.8, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.22, 95% CI [0.01, 0.41, and no 
main effect of SWITCH (F < 1; Fig. 6). Moreover, contrary to our hypothesis, there was no significant interac-
tion between CONDITION and SWITCH (F(3,51) = 2.1, p = 0.11, ηp2 = 0.11, 95% CI [0.00, 0.24]). None of the 
other interactions were significant (Fs < 1.8, ps > 0.11, ηp2s < 0.09). Because behavioral confidence effects emerge 
primarily on difficult trials comparing pre- and switch confidence, and in the interaction between SWITCH and 
Figure 6. Time-voltage plots and scalp-topographies showing the CPP in the last block prior to the switch 
in cue-condition contingencies (left), and in the switch block (right). Inserts show single-subject data for 
CPP amplitude and slope across conditions. Single dots show single-subject data, bars display mean of the 
distribution (solid line), 95% confidence interval (dark grey shaded area), and 1 standard deviation (light grey 
shaded area). Both measures reflect conditions, and amplitude shows more modulation by the switch. Scalp 
topographies show voltage averages across 40 ms prior to response. All topographies are thresholded between 2 
and 7 µV. Data are not smoothed for display purposes. Shaded error bars depict the standard error of the mean. 
Time-window for Amplitude: 180 to 80 ms prior to response. Time-window for calculation of Slope: 400 to 
100 ms prior to response.
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CONDITION when only the easy and difficult conditions are included, we conducted an exploratory analysis 
targeting these conditions. The repeated measures ANOVA included the factors POSTERIORITY (3 levels; 1: CZ, 
2: CPZ, 3: PZ) and SWITCH (pre/switch; that is Blocks 4 and 5), and a 2-level factor CONDITION (easy/diffi-
cult). This analysis yielded a main effect of CONDITION (F(1,17) = 6.9, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.29, 95% CI [0.01, 0.54]), 
a main effect of POSTERIORITY (F(2,34) = 3.8, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.18, 95% CI [0.00, 0.37) and as expected no main 
effect of SWITCH (F < 1), but the expected interaction between SWITCH and CONDITION was significant 
(F(1,17) = 6.0, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.26, 95% CI [0.00, 0.52]). No other comparisons reached significance (Fs < 2.0, 
ps > 0.15, ηp2s < 0.11). The interaction between SWITCH and CONDITION is explained by the same numeri-
cal changes as the interaction between SWITCH and CONDITION in the confidence data (cmp. Figs 3 and 6): 
Difficult trials show a numerically larger CPP amplitude in the switch block compared to the pre-switch block 
which however did not reach significance at the chosen alpha level of 5% (7.52 µV vs. 9.49 µV; t(17) = 1.9, p = 0.07, 
r equivalent = 0.32, 95% CI [0.02, 0.56], BF01 = 0.89), whereas easy trials show a numerically smaller CPP ampli-
tude in the switch block compared to the pre-switch block, also not reaching significance (12.42 µV vs. 10.34 µV; 
t(17) = 1.8, p = 0.09, r equivalent = 0.29, 95% CI [−0.04, 0.64], BF01 = 1.11).
Finally, analysis of trials in which cues were non-predictive of the stimulus-category also yielded the same pat-
tern of differing amplitude levels across conditions as all other comparisons. The univariate ANOVA testing the 
4-level factor CONDITION showed the expected main effect (F(3,51) = 11.8, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.41, 95% CI [0.33, 
0.57]). Pairwise comparisons of neighboring conditions show a significant differences only between difficult and 
high mean, high variance stimuli (t(17) = 3.3, p = 0.004, r equivalent = 0.49, 95% CI [0.26, 0.71]), but no other 
significant results in paired comparisons between neighboring conditions (easy – low low: t < 1, BF01 = 2.84; low 
low – high high: t(17) = 1.9, p = 0.08, r equivalent = 0.30, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.53], BF01 = 1.01). We thus find differ-
ences in stimulus processing driven by the stimulus condition, regardless of whether the condition was expected 
on a given trial.
EEG Summary. To summarize, we established that predicted confidence drives neural preparation for stimulus 
processing as reflected in the CNV. Stimulus condition showed a modulating effect on the CPP, a neural maker 
of decision-making, in line with differences in performance. While small differences in performance confidence, 
such as associated with the medium conditions, led to differences in predicted confidence, we could not conclu-
sively establish an effect of these subtle differences in confidence on neural preparation of stimulus processing in 
the CNV. Please refer to the Supplementary Information for an alternative analysis of the EEG data, which yields 
comparable results.
Discussion
In the present study, we addressed the question of whether people learn about their own confidence in perceptual 
decisions, evident in confidence predictions. More specifically, we hypothesized that predicted confidence would 
closely follow actual performance confidence, rather than objective accuracy. Our findings support this hypothe-
sis: People quickly learned to associate predicted confidence with visual cues in a perceptual categorization task, 
showing the same systematic biases as in their performance confidence. As expected, predicted confidence in turn 
affected performance confidence, as evident after sudden, un-announced changes in cue-stimulus contingencies. 
This finding points towards the relevance of expectations as additional sources of information (cues) that become 
integrated in confidence estimates. This expands our understanding of the multi-cue nature of this metacognitive 
evaluation, in showing that information beyond physical features of the stimulus and subsequent properties of 
the decision process are taken into account. Finally, the findings from our EEG analyses suggest that predicted 
confidence affects neural preparation for and neural processing of the visual task, showing that confidence pre-
dictions affect task preparation. Our study has thus strong theoretical implications for the role of metacognitive 
judgements in task preparation and performance evaluation.
In recent years, a large body of empirical evidence has accrued suggesting that people are capable of accurately 
tracking their own performance, even in the absence of feedback (e.g.29,30). Despite these advances, dominant 
theories of metacognition still struggle to explain how, and based on what information, confidence signals are 
formed (for recent accounts see1,2,7,31). In the present study, we extended previous accounts of metacognition in 
two important ways: First, our findings suggest that performance confidence is at least to some extent based on 
predicted confidence (see also13). Second, we propose that confidence predictions can be used to prepare for the 
uncertainty of the upcoming decision.
Regarding the first implication of our work: Performance confidence across conditions becomes more similar 
following the switch in cue-condition contingencies when predictions and actual conditions do not match up - 
this shows that expectation influences experience in the domain of confidence. In detail, participants were overly 
confident regarding their performance on difficult trials, when these were initiated by cues that were associated 
with an easy stimulus. This finding suggests that predicted confidence - in addition to other informative cues such 
as experienced difficulty - feeds into performance confidence. This interpretation fits a hypothesis developed 
in the context of metacognition in memory (metamemory), which proposes that metacognitive judgements are 
based on multiple heuristic cues32,33 such as the familiarity of the question34 and the accessibility of information at 
retrieval35. We have recently proposed a similar mechanism for decision confidence, suggesting that confidence 
is not just purely driven by the evidence that forms the basis of the decision but also other heuristic cues, such as 
the reliability of evidence or decision speed7. Here, we provide important evidence that one of the multiple cues 
informing confidence judgments are experience-based expectations regarding task performance.
The results neatly fit a Bayesian account of human cognition, where experience leads to the formation of pri-
ors. Once prior beliefs exist, they inform all inferences about the true state of the world, i.e. the posterior belief. 
We can maintain accurate inferences about the environments we act in, because posterior beliefs also integrate 
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observable evidence, and in turn affect future priors. Translated to the current study, we show that confidence 
itself, after repeated experience, becomes a prior belief on performance in the task. The decision itself then pro-
vides information that together with the prior is incorporated in a posterior belief in task-performance. It remains 
for future work to develop mathematical formalizations of this framework. Such formalizations would need to 
address the key question of whether common or distinct representations underpin the different confidence read-
outs used in the present study, and the related question of whether these readouts are informed by at least par-
tially distinct cues (cf. metamemory research where prospective feeling of knowing judgments and retrospective 
confidence judgments are thought to be at least partially dissociable in terms of their computational basis and 
adaptive uses, even if both reflect the same underlying construct of the availability of information in memory36,37.
An implication of findings in line with this theoretic account is the idea that the utility of confidence is not 
limited to evaluating past decisions. Decision confidence is often regarded as an internal proxy for feedback38–40. 
Here, we argue that in addition to such self-evaluative, post-hoc weighting of evidence based on how uncertain 
we feel about a recent decision, confidence could also be useful in anticipating uncertainty or effort of an upcom-
ing decision. Such prospective metacognitive judgements have been understudied in the context of decision mak-
ing (see also41; but see13). In contrast, research on metamemory has focused extensively on predictive judgments. 
This research has established, for instance, that ease-of-learning judgements (EOLs;10) and judgements of learning 
(JOLs;12) regulate the allocation of study time. Here, we build upon this work, and show an important conceptual 
transfer: Predicted confidence appears to also play a role in the context of perceptual decision making.
Taken together, our results provide an important step towards determining how metacognitive judgements are 
formed internally, and may be utilized in the future, thus extending the classic frameworks by including predicted 
confidence. The multi-cue model of confidence that we propose here links the field of decision confidence with 
a line of research focusing on metamemory, highlighting that similar mechanisms might generate metacognitive 
signals in the case of both choices and memory. Future studies should aim to shed light on which other cues feed 
into confidence signals and also how precisely predicted confidence is formed.
Moreover, the idea that expectation and experience of confidence inform each other continuously makes sense 
if we assume that predicted confidence in particular guides how much effort people invest into individual choices 
(see also11,42). The notion that confidence predictions can be used to guide behavior of course also applies to other 
examples of metacognitive control, for instance allocation of study time10,12, and decisions about whether to rely 
on one’s prospective memory or to set external reminders to complete future tasks43.
The relevance of predictions for perceptual decision making has been highlighted in various contexts. On the 
one hand, expectations of perceptual events themselves influence preparation for and processing of these stimuli 
(44 for a review). On the other hand, it has been shown that characteristics associated with these perceptual events 
such as their reward value affect behavior, including oculomotor responses in visual search45,46. Our study extends 
this view substantially by showing that, in the wider context of learning, not only external events but also internal 
evaluation of performance affects expectations. Internal models require continuous updating to remain valid and 
useful vehicles of preparation47.
The present study shows that prediction and experience inform each other, and that this continuous update 
allows accurate assessments of the environment. These findings furthermore match the results of a recent study 
by Fleming and colleagues13, who found that both predicted confidence as well as performance confidence were 
at least to some extent informed by the other type of judgment on the previous trial. This effect was stronger for 
predicted confidence, which was largely driven by the experienced confidence on the previous trial. However, it 
should be noted that the task used in this study kept difficulty constant using a staircase procedure and that par-
ticipants had no context-specific cues that could help them anticipate the upcoming decision.
A related idea has recently been investigated in a study by Guggenmos and colleagues40. The authors investi-
gated the role of confidence in reinforcement learning, suggesting that presently experienced confidence is judged 
constantly against expected confidence, thus serving as a proxy for external feedback. One important way in 
which our study extends this work is that, in contrast to this previous work40, we measured predicted confidence 
prior to the onset of the visual target of perceptual-decision making, thus measuring a truly experience-based, 
predictive signal.
Our findings furthermore suggest that predicted confidence leads to changes in stimulus processing, reflected 
in two key EEG correlates. Our first analysis targeted the CNV - a measure of preparatory activity. CNV ampli-
tude increased in anticipation of a highly-confident trial. Second, we focused on the CPP - a neural correlate of 
perceptual processing thought to reflect evidence accumulation to a pre-set threshold21. In addition to replicating 
several key findings reported by O’Connell and colleagues21 (see also22), we found the CPP to vary with stimulus 
condition. Additional analyses ruled out that this CPP effect was driven by differences in reaction time and thus 
trial-by-trial variations in perceived difficulty. This supports the interpretation that this finding reflects modula-
tion of neural processing through expectations. This interpretation is furthermore supported by the finding that 
the clear pattern of stimulus condition was diminished immediately after the switch in cue-condition contingen-
cies, similar to the changes in confidence after the switch.
One of the key findings of the original study by O’Connell and colleagues21 was that CPP waveforms are char-
acterized by a fixed amplitude, similar to a pre-set decision threshold. Our finding of a variation in CPP amplitude 
by condition stands in contrast to these results and instead suggests that participants adjusted their decision 
threshold flexibly across stimulus conditions. It should be noted that the propensity to resort to such a strategy 
could have been increased in our specific paradigm by presenting people with valid cues, allowing them to more 
flexibly prepare stimulus processing. A condition-contingent variation in decision boundary was similarly found 
in a separate diffusion model analysis, further supporting this interpretation of our data.
There is an apparent contradiction in our EEG findings reported in this study: While our CNV results could 
suggest that people were more ready to process the stimulus when they expected the upcoming decision to be 
easy compared to difficult, our CPP results (and the additional drift-diffusion model findings) seem to suggest 
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the opposite, with a higher decision threshold for easy compared to difficult stimuli and thus a more cautious 
response mode. There are two possible explanations for this seemingly contradictory pattern of results. First, 
it is important to point out that the CNV is not a motor readiness potential (cf. the Bereitschaftspotential) - its 
amplitude does not reflect primarily the motor preparation to make a quick response, but is more likely asso-
ciated with preparation of cognitive aspects of the upcoming task20. In fact, one possibility is that just as the 
stimulus-preceding negativity, a correlate found in anticipation of feedback, the CNV scales with expected infor-
mation in the stimulus48,49. Another, even more interesting alternative is that the divergent pattern could be inter-
preted as evidence for the possibility that participants dynamically adjust the duration spent on different stages 
of the decision making process. More specifically, the speeding of sensory processes for trials expected to be easy 
(CNV finding), might have automatically have ‘freed up’ additional time for more cautious sampling behavior 
(CPP finding). Therefore the two findings are not necessarily contradictory. Moreover, such an increase in sam-
pling behavior was not visible in overall RT differences between conditions, thus future studies should investigate 
this possibility using careful mental-chronometry techniques to disentangle the effects of expectation on different 
stages of the decision-making process. Taken together, we found that predicted confidence had an effect on neural 
correlates of stimulus preparation and neural correlates of stimulus processing, highlighting the relevance of this 
internal estimate for the neural computations underlying perceptual decision making.
The present study sheds new light on perceptual decision-making in the absence of feedback, highlighting the 
active role confidence seems to play in decision-making processes. In this study, we focused on a novel metacog-
nitive measure, predicted decision confidence. Our results suggest that confidence integrates information from 
various sources, and affects neural processing profoundly.
Methods
All methods were carried out in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations pertaining to non-clinical 
human research, as instructed by the institutional review board. Methods and procedures were approved by the 
Medical Sciences Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee, Medical Sciences Divisional Office, Oxford. All 
data was collected at the Department of Experimental Psychology in Oxford. All participants provided written 
informed consent.
Participants. We tested 16 participants in the behavioral experiment (Experiment 1) and 20 participants in 
the EEG experiment (Experiment 2). Participants took part in only one of the experiments. Two participants were 
post-hoc excluded from Experiment 2, one because of excessive noise in electrodes crucial to the analysis, the 
other because the staircasing procedure failed and the participant displayed behavior substantively different from 
any other of the 35 participants (see Supplementary Information for a separate analysis of this dataset).
In both experiments, participants sat in an electrically shielded, sound attenuating booth to minimize dis-
traction and artifacts in the EEG recordings. Stimuli were presented on a 20″ CRT monitor with a 75 Hz refresh 
rate using the MATLAB toolbox Psychtoolbox 3 with a 70 cm viewing distance50–52. All responses were made 
with a USB keyboard. The color judgments were made with the “c” or “n” key (left or right thumb). Confidence 
responses were made with the upper number line (keys “1”, “2”, “3”, “8”, “9”, and “0”) using the index, middle and 
ring fingers of the two hands.
Statistical analysis. All statistical analysis was conducted in Matlab using the Measures of Effect Size (MES) 
Toolbox53. Where possible, we report point-biserial correlation coefficients (r equivalent). In addition to standard 
RT and accuracy measures, we compare performance across conditions as inverse efficiency, calculated as median 
correct RT divided by accuracy (inverse efficiency score IES26). Moreover, our design included two conditions of 
medium difficulty, which our previous studies had found to be matched in performance7,19. We therefore report 
Bayes Factors (BFs) for all non-significant t-tests to be able to assess the probability with which the null hypoth-
esis is true given the data, using the R package BayesFactor by Morey, Rouder and colleagues54,55. We report the 
BF as support for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis as BF01. Figures are based on a variation of 
the notBoxPlot function56.
Staircase procedure. Participants completed extensive training in the perceptual decision task, both with 
and without confidence judgements (400 trials), during which an adaptive procedure was used to match the 
medium conditions. Predictive cues were introduced after 300 trials, to make sure that participants were able 
to perform the basic task well before having to deal with this increased complexity. In detail, conditions were 
matched with regard to percent accuracy. At the beginning of the staircase blocks (practice blocks two to eight), 
mean evidence in the low mean evidence, low variance condition was adjusted if accuracy between the two 
medium conditions differed in the preceding block. During this staircase procedure, participants were told that 
they were currently completing practice blocks, but were not told about the performance-adjusted increase or 
decrease in difficulty.
EEG recording and pre-processing. A Neuroscan Synamps2 system (10 GΩ input impedance; 29.8 nV 
resolution; Neuroscan, El Paso, TX, USA)57 was used to record EEG data from 32 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in 
an elastic cap at locations FP1, FPZ, FP2, F7, F3, FZ, F4, F8, FT7, FC3, FCZ, FC4, FT8, T7, C3, CZ, C4, T8, TP7, 
CP3, CPZ, CP4, TP8, P7, P3, PZ, P4, P8, POZ, O1, OZ, and O2. Additional six external electrodes were attached: 
to the outer canthi of the left and right eyes, above and below the right eye to measure electro-oculograms (EOGs), 
and to the left and right mastoids. Electrode recordings were referenced to the right mastoid. All electrode imped-
ances were kept below 50 kΩ. EEG data were recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Data were online high-pass 
filtered at 0.1 Hz to avoid slow-wave drifts. The data were low-pass filtered at 24 Hz with a Hamming-windowed 
sinc finite impulse response function, as implemented in EEGLab58–60 prior to epoch extraction to avoid noise 
in the recording to inflate peak-measures of the components of interest. All analyses were performed on data 
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down-sampled to 250 Hz. Auto-detected noisy channels were removed, and interpolated using the EEGLab pop_
rejchan function58. We extracted cue-epoched data from 300 ms pre cue to 2800 ms post cue. These epochs were 
baselined to a window 100 to 200 ms post-cue, to prevent differences in the visual response to the stimuli affecting 
the baseline. Epochs with noise in the component-specific target electrodes were identified using first a proba-
bilistic (pop_jointprob) followed by a thresholding (pop_eegthresh) approach (both implemented in EEGLab58). 
This excluded epochs that either fell outside a 95% confidence interval or had voltage differences ranging above 
or below 50 µV from the baseline (i.e. changes of more than 100 µV per epoch).
EEG analysis. The EEG analysis focused on two neural markers of perceptual decision-making, which are 
associated with stimulus preparation and stimulus processing, respectively. The first target component was a 
preparatory negative-going potential in anticipation of the stimulus, following the cue: the contingent-negative 
variation (CNV). The CNV is a slow-wave component, associated with the readiness to respond27.
We measured the preparatory potential as the average voltage amplitude in four time-windows preceding 
the stimulus: −399 ms to −300 ms, −299 ms to −200 ms, −199 ms to −100 ms, and −99 ms to stimulus onset. 
The preparatory potential was estimated across an electrode cluster containing the electrodes C3 - CZ - C4 - 
CP3 - CPZ - CP4 - P3 - Pz - P4. We chose this large cluster as the amplitude of the CNV and related preparatory 
potentials typically varies across parietal and frontal electrodes20,61–63; we included posteriority of the electrode 
within the cluster as a factor in our analyses to assess scalp topography of observed effects. We predicted that 
CNV amplitude would scale with the levels of predicted confidence, hypothesizing that the expectation of a high 
confidence would lead to a greater readiness to respond to the stimulus. We therefore expected cues indicating 
easy trials leading to the largest CNV (most negative amplitude), and cues indicating difficult trials leading to the 
smallest CNV (least negative amplitude).
The second component we focused on was the centro-parietal positivity at the time of the response to the per-
ceptual decision (CPP)21,22. The CPP is associated with the sampling of available evidence in perceptual decisions 
and peaks at the time of the response. Our CPP analysis focused on two main features of the component, taken to 
reflect different aspects of the decision-making process: The slope of the CPP is suggested to reflect sampling of 
the perceptual evidence, whereas its amplitude is taken to reflect the internal threshold for accumulated evidence 
that needs to be reached for a decision to be made21,22.
Our first aim was to replicate the finding that a steeper slope of the component accompanies faster reac-
tion times. We further tested whether the condition in which a stimulus appeared would affect the slope of the 
component, above and beyond the variance explained by RTs22. Similarly, we hypothesized that CPP amplitude 
would vary between conditions, independent of RTs, as suggested by differential decision thresholds between 
conditions; these differential thresholds were indicated by a drift-diffusion model analyses we performed on the 
present data and in past modeling work within the paradigm28; [Supplementary Information]. Second, our design 
allowed us to test the idea that stimulus processing can be affected not only by the stimulus features (condition), 
but also by expectations about conditions. We used this setup to test for expectation-driven modulations of CPP 
amplitude by comparing identical conditions pre- and post-switch; we expected an interaction between the effects 
of condition and switch on CPP amplitude.
A post-cue baseline avoided contamination of the measurement by cue-driven variation (see below). Using 
trial-by-trial reaction time recordings the data were realigned to the individual responses. We measured CPP 
slope by fitting a linear regression to each participant’s individual data in a window ranging from 400 ms to 100 ms 
before the response. CPP amplitude was measured as the peak in a time-window ranging from 180 ms to 80 ms 
before the response21 in an electrode cluster containing the electrodes CZ-CPZ-PZ21.
For the CPP analysis of pre-switch blocks, the lowest number of trials entered per participant was 44, the aver-
age was 93. For the CNV analysis, the lowest number of trials per participant per condition was 41, the average 
was 72. Because the CNV was measures across a larger time-window, epochs were more likely to contain noise 
and therefore be discarded (see Supplementary Table 3 for details). Please refer to the Supplementary Information 
for an analysis that included data that was pre-processed identically, with the addition of an extra step, a current 
source density correction (Current Source Density Corrected).
Code availability statement. All analysis code is available from the lead author on request.
Data Availability
Data are available from the lead author on request.
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